Leviathan in Lilliput

Brookings Stability Operations event

Posted in Afghanistan, Combat Advisors, Counterinsurgency, Force restructuring, Iraq by cjmewett on March 27, 2009

This afternoon I attended a panel discussion held at the Brookings Institution that focused on the new Army field manual for stability operations, FM 3-07. The discussion was moderated by Janine Davidson, and the panel was composed of Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (and former president of the Center for a New American Security) Michele Flournoy, Brookings Director of Foreign Policy Studies and reputedly soon-to-be-announced U.S. Ambassador to Mexico Carlos Pascual, and LTG William Caldwell, commander of the Army’s Combined Arms Center.

UPDATE: CSPAN has the video up here. My question is around the 1:22 mark if you’re interested. My voice doesn’t sound like that in real life, I promise.

I might write more on this later, but for now I’ll just post what I wrote in the comments section at Abu Muqawama regarding the question I asked USD Flournoy: (more…)

The Accidental Guerilla: Bacevich’s take

Posted in Counterinsurgency, Grand strategy, Iraq, Middle East by cjmewett on March 3, 2009

The March/April 2009 The National Interest arrived in today’s mail. The last several pages are filled with a piece called “Raising Jihad,” Andrew Bacevich’s review of Dave Kilcullen’s new book The Accidental Guerilla, which I’ve just nearly finished. (My impressions are generally more positive than Bacevich’s, and my opinions about the author’s motive more charitable, but I don’t mean to give my own review just now.) Andrew Exum posted about the review yesterday morning on Abu Muqawama, and remarks that the realists and COINdinistas may have more in common than they think. (more…)

Robert Kagan Tries to Slander Realism, Fails

Robert Kagan is a serious, clear-headed man. While the rest of us have been distracted by the orgy of internationalist optimism, he’s been fixing his keen eye on foreign intrigue in places we scarcely knew existed (a la Ralph Peters). Lest you forget, “the nature of nations, like people, never changes. Today’s political realists” – and chumps like you and me – “say that economics rather than military might has become the guiding principle of countries, but the conflict in Georgia shows us otherwise.” And you can bet that Kagan is going to tell us how. [A warning before the jump: I went a little crazy, to the tune of 2,300 words.] (more…)

Tactical mistakes by a “strategic thinker”

Posted in 4GW, Grand strategy, Iran, Iraq, Middle East by cjmewett on March 13, 2008

Admiral William Fallon, commander of U.S. Central Command, resigned yesterday in the wake of reports that he and the President were not on the same page about U.S. policy towards Iran. His unlikely assassin: Tom Barnett, a man who professes admiration for Fallon and has identified him as one of the greatest strategic thinkers in today’s American military. Barnett’s anti-White House hit piece in Esquire illustrates the limitations of a self-styled strategist trying to moonlight as a journalist: in making what he must’ve thought was a good faith effort to report the news and inform the public, Barnett struck a damaging blow to the sort of strategic approach he encourages in his books.

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More military aid as Saudis continue to hinder war effort

Posted in Iran, Iraq, Middle East, Saudi Arabia by cjmewett on July 31, 2007

Media reports today indicate that the U.S. will provide an influx of military aid to several allies in the Middle East, to include Saudi Arabia.  According to the BBC, $20 billion in new assistance will be split between the kingdom and several Gulf states.  This comes on the heels of a story in the New York Times last Friday that detailed American frustration at perceived Saudi obstructionism vis-à-vis Iraq.  As far back as January, the Times reports, Saudi officials approached the U.S. government with alleged evidence of Iraqi PM Nuri al-Maliki’s complicity with Iran.  These allegations were dismissed as false by administration officials (and the supporting paperwork declared forgeries).

That the Saudis oppose the Shia government in Baghdad is no secret. US Ambassador to the UN (and formerly to Iraq) Zalmay Khalilzad recently wrote that “several of Iraq’s neighbors — not only Syria and Iran but also some friends of the United States — are pursuing destabilizing policies” in the region.  Administration officials have apparently admitted that this was a reference to Saudi Arabia and the UAE, in particular.  So why is the U.S. government seemingly willing to overlook a significant ally’s complete refusal to accommodate American interests on a priority of U.S. foreign policy, namely the stabilization of Iraq and quashing of civil (or proxy) war there?

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Response to Westbrook Sullivan at Weekend Economist

Posted in Afghanistan, Grand strategy, Iraq, Middle East, NATO, UK by cjmewett on April 11, 2007

This piece is a bit different to what I usually post on the blog: more formal, somewhat less analytical, more big-picture. Ryan directed me to the geopolitics blog at Weekend Economist, co-edited by one of his Waseda classmates, and suggested that I submit something as a guest contributor. I took a brief look through some of the recent posts and chose one that (though it’s nearly a month old) seemed to demand response, as you’ll see below. I’m submitting it to WE, and if they decide they want to run it and/or any other associated material on their site, I’ll be sure to link back here.

UPDATE: The WE gents have been gracious enough to re-run this entry on their site.

I should note beforehand that I’ve met West, and he’s a very intelligent, well-spoken, and generally pleasant sort of fellow. It’s entirely possible that his original blog was written as a sort of Devil’s Advocate angle, but I feel like someone needed to tell the other side of the story. I hope he won’t find my piece particularly aggressive or otherwise offensive.

EDIT: For some reason I keep trying to call him “Westwood,” God knows why.

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